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Abstract 
This paper addresses the construction of the concepts of populism and anti-populism and their 
metaphorical realisations in British news discourse, and specifically in the Daily Mail and The 
Guardian, in 2016, a crucial year for populist politics. The analysis of two corpora made of 
articles from the two newspapers is based on the methodology offered by Corpus Linguistics 
and Corpus Approach to Critical Metaphor Analysis. The metaphors of populism emerging 
from the analysis highlight a substantially standardised use of the metaphor POPULISM IS 
(UPWARD) MOVEMENT, both for populists and anti-populists, but with diverging evaluations. 
The authors argue that metaphors play a key role in orienting the public perception of populism 
based on shared modes of understanding social and political life. 
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owards the end of his final speech at the European Parliament on 29 January 2020, just 
two days before the UK officially left the EU, Nigel Farage celebrated the outcome of the 
Brexit referendum and quipped about the political backdrop against which Brexit was taking 
place: “[t]here is a historic battle going on now across the West—in Europe, America and 
elsewhere. It is globalism against populism. And you may loathe populism, but I'll tell you a 
funny thing—it's becoming very popular” (Peck 2020). By playing with the common root of 
 
1 This paper has been conceived and written jointly by the three authors. The individual 
contributions of the authors are identified as follows: Massimiliano Demata is the author of 
Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6; Michelangelo Conoscenti has written Section 5 and made the two 
corpora used in this paper machine-readable; Massimiliano Demata and Yannis Stavrakakis 
have jointly written the Introduction and Section 1. Section 7 has been written jointly by the 
three authors. 
T 
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“populism” and “popular” in opposition to “globalism,” Farage was praising his own success 
story of a well-implemented populist agenda. The implicit assumption is that the frequent 
appellation of “populist” which Farage and other leaders and parties abroad had been 
attributed by rival politicians and media was disparaging, as populism is “loathed” by those 
who oppose it. Indeed, especially within the European context (because, arguably, global 
comparison and historical contextualization reveal a much more diverse and ambivalent 
picture), the “populist” topos has slowly come to operate as an almost undisputed ‘common 
place,’ as an index suggesting some kind of imminent danger and as a warning signal 
indicating the threat coming from a grave political pathology. 
In effect, Farage’s words reflect the highly conflictual nature of populism as a set of political 
ideals and practices as well as the diverging meanings of the term populism as it is de facto 
negotiated in discourse, becoming itself a focus of ideological struggle. In today’s political and 
media culture, populism acquires either a positive or a negative connotation (mostly the latter, 
as we have seen, given the sedimentation of a pejorative meaning over time). This raises 
questions on the contested meaning of populism in the public domain, and how it is shaped by 
media and political discourses as well as by the public at large, sometimes producing the 
‘common place’ meaning often taken for granted in today’s Europe. Indeed, while populism has 
been thoroughly studied in political science, less attention has been paid to “vernacular” 
populism (Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart 2011, 112; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2016, 18; Hamo, 
Kampf and Weiss-Yanim 2018, 1), that is, to the non-scholarly use of then term, and 
specifically to how metaphors contribute to shaping the meaning and the public perception of 
populism.   
This paper addresses the issue of how populism is conceptualised in news media, and 
specifically of how metaphors contribute to the evaluation of populism in its “vernacular” use 
in two leading British newspapers, The Guardian and the Daily Mail. Two corpora have been 
compiled, one for each newspaper, collecting all the articles where populis* appears. The year 
chosen for the two corpora is 2016, which was, as claimed by the Wall Street Journal, “the 
Year Populism Went Mainstream” (Glaston 2016). The two corpora will be analysed with two 
research questions in mind:  
 
1. What is the meaning (or meanings) of populism emerging from its “vernacular” use?  
2. How is the meaning of populism shaped by metaphors?  
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The paper opens with a theoretical discussion of populism and antipopulism, which 
emphasises the need to trace these oppositional ‘markers’ in discourse. This is followed by a 
review of how news media have addressed populism. The two corpora are then analysed in 
their main lexical features and the most frequent metaphors used to define populism. The 
main hypothesis is that metaphors used to address populism are not just a key element in its 
evaluation, but also contribute to (and derive from) a conceptualization of society based on a 
sociocognitive and discursive construction of the social space in terms of physical space. In this 
sense, metaphors play a key role in orienting the public perception of populism on the basis of 
shared modes of understanding social and political life. 
 
1. Populism and anti-populism 
There are many interpretations of populism, and its true meaning still seems to be elusive: 
populism has been seen as an ideology, a soft ideology, a thin ideology, a discourse, a strategy, 
an organisational pattern or a style (for a comprehensive presentation of different orientations 
on the topic, see Rovira Kaltwaser et al. 2017). The one issue that most scholars seem to 
intuitively agree on is that populism mainly consists in the elaboration of an antagonistic 
political space dominated by the struggle between the elite and the people. This social, 
cultural, and political chasm is used by the populists in order to justify their claims to power: 
they present themselves as the true voice of ‘the people’ as opposed to ‘traditional’ politicians 
and the economic and institutional establishment, who embody ‘the elite.’ How can we refine 
such an intuition in order to produce a set of operational criteria for the differential 
identification of populism? Interestingly enough, populism has recently been defined on the 
basis of a dichotomic identity in ideological and discursive terms: populism is constructed in 
opposition to what has been called anti-populism, i.e. all those parties and leaders who are 
competing with the populists.  
This is important because, obviously, populism cannot be studied in isolation from the broader 
social and political stakes framing its emergence. In this sense, the populist/anti-populist 
divide is at the basis of two diverging ideas of how democracy should work, and scholars have 
attempted to account for the nature of this divide. This is also important for analytical reasons 
because the meaning of populism is usually created by those who oppose and often demonize 
it. As a result, in certain contexts, the pejorative signification has all but eliminated all the 
others (Stavrakakis 2017a). In that sense, a rigorous linguistic and political study of populism 
must also be a rigorous study of anti-populism. In discourse analysis, this becomes, in 
addition, a methodological priority to the extent that, very often, the discursive material 
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directly accessible to the analyst is predominantly anti-populist. If being a ‘populist’ is rather 
rarely chosen by politician as an acceptable self-description, then the ‘populist’ designation 
has to be the creation of an anti-populist opponent or the analyst herself. It is also important 
to note that the division is not limited within the political sub-system but permeates the socio-
cultural field.  
Beyond the ideological differences between different populist movements and parties, Ostiguy 
defines populism and anti-populism in terms of opposition between the “low” and the “high” 
(Ostiguy 2017). In particular, he looks at the populism/anti-populism division in sociocultural 
and sociopolitical terms: the “low” is associated with the populist tendency to personalism and 
coarseness, in direct opposition to the “high,” often represented by the traditional parties, 
which claim to support institutions, legal procedures and proper manners (Moffitt 2018: 7). 
From a perspective more anchored to discourse rather than style, Stavrakakis has argued that 
the populism/anti-populism dichotomy has gradually emerged as the most characteristic 
feature of political discourse in Europe, to the extent that “the axis between populism and 
anti-populism emerges as the dominant cleavage, and ideological rupture that organises the 
political meaning of our current predicament, orienting the discursive production of various 
political actors in Greece, southern Europe and beyond” (Stavrakakis 2014, 505). This 
development has been facilitated by the crisis of representation that marked the 
administration of the 2008 world financial crisis. Especially since, within Europe, this 
administration, in terms of actual policies, was largely conditioned by European and Eurozone 
institutions, the populism/anti-populism divide has largely coincided with the anti-
European/pro-European rift. Most European populist parties are nationalist or at least anti-
EU and compete against pro-EU parties, with the result that sometimes “Europe and 
populism are viewed as the two extremes of a radical antithesis” (Stavrakakis 2014, 510)—
although one should also take into account ideological orientations that are simultaneously 
pro-EU and anti-EU. Indeed, the eurosceptic dimension is particularly evident in the United 
Kingdom: the outcome of the Brexit referendum of 2016 was a victory of the (partly) populist 
Leave campaign, which appealed to anti-immigration feelings and was a political offspring of 
decades of Euroscepticism fed by conservative politicians and most tabloid press (Kneuer 
2018). 
At the same time, registering the importance of anti-populism from a discursive perspective is 
also important on epistemological and ethical grounds. Scholarship on populism has rarely 
been neutral on the populist/anti-populist divide. The pejorative meaning of populism has a 
long tradition in scholarship and has become naturalised in discourse, constituting a ‘common 
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place’ in debates about populism (Stavrakakis 2017a, 4-5; 2018, 34). Furthermore, anti-
populism is “the default position for the academy” (Moffitt 2018, 5), given that most political 
scientists who study populism also consider it as a political practice dangerous to democracy 
with supposedly authoritarian leanings (Moffitt 2016, 134-142) and usually identify it with the 
far right (Stavrakakis 2018, 35). This rather euro-centric perspective often ignores the 
historical complexity and the comparative variance of populism(s) around the globe and 
betrays a certain bias in favour of elitist models of democracy and away from any concept of 
popular sovereignty and popular participation in decision-making processes. In some cases, it 
can also be an indication of poor, unreflective scholarship: “The study of populism is 
instructive about the consequences of condescension, arrogance, and ignorance on the part of 
elites and intellectuals” (Vann Woodward 1981, 32, emphasis added). 
Following Ostiguy’s and Stavrakakis’s distinction between populism and anti-populism, if a 
leader or a party is accused of being populist, this is usually done pejoratively and is produced 
discursively mainly by those political actors who claim to oppose populism. However, the 
pejorative nature of the term is so well embedded in political, media, and academic culture 
that for a long time it has rarely been used with an alternative, more positive meaning. 
Indeed, in their survey of the British press published in 2011, Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart 
noticed how populism had become a term of insult by whoever used it. While the term could be 
attached to a wide variety of policies, populist could be used by either the conservative or the 
progressive press to attack their opponents. Yet, the growing success of populist leaders and 
parties since Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart’s paper was published raises questions as to how 
the meaning of populism is constructed and regarded in the public domain. This calls for the 
development of new hypotheses on the often paradoxical interaction between politics, 
academia and the media; for example, on account of their undifferentiated anti-populist 
default positioning, very often the media and academia are perceived as parts of the 
establishment and, as a result, their denunciation of populism actually helps the forces 
denounced as populist to present themselves as the only real threats to ‘the system,’ 
irrespective of their ideological/class location.  
Hence, a rigorous discursive analysis of the meaning(s) with which the word populism is 
invested within the populism/anti-populism nexus requires the development of formal, 
reflexive criteria for the identification of populism, something requiring an awareness of the 
historical and geographical-cultural background. For example, it is instructive how the 
progressive, egalitarian populist tradition in the US (going back to the People’s Party of the 
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1890s, a precursor of Roosevelt’s New Deal) conditions the positive definition employed even 
by mainstream politicians like Obama: 
 
Speaking at a press conference alongside the president of Mexico and the prime minister of 
Canada, President Barack Obama offered a strong implicit rebuke to Donald Trump, 
saying, “I’m not prepared to concede the notion that some of the rhetoric that’s been 
popping up is populist.” […] Instead, Obama said that he is the true populist. “I care about 
workers being able to have a collective voice in the workplace and get their fair share of the 
pie,” he said. “I want to make sure that kids get a decent education.” (Yglesias 2016) 
 
Given the aforementioned complexities, one of the most common limitations of contemporary 
populism research is the lack of a rigorous and operational working definition allowing us to 
encompass signifying fluctuations. This is rather paradoxical to the extent that a variety of 
research orientations today—ideational, discursive, etc.—seem to tentatively agree on a set of 
shared common (minimal) criteria designating populism “as a formal discursive articulation 
dividing society into two relatively homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the people versus 
the elite” (Andreadis and Ruth-Lovell 2017, 112). This recent rendering of the ideational 
definition operates in a more or less similar wavelength with a discursive perspective drawing 
on the so-called Essex School. For the latter, populism presupposes  
 
a dichotomic discourse in which ‘the people’ are juxtaposed to ‘the elite’ along the lines of a 
down/up antagonism in which ‘the people’ is discursively constructed as a large powerless 
group through opposition to ‘the elite’ conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful 
group. Populist politics thus claim to represent ‘the people’ against an ‘elite’ that frustrates 
their legitimate demands, and present these demands as expressions of the will of ‘the 
people’ (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 310). 
 
Here, the difference from the original (full) ideational definition is largely a difference of 
emphasis. In Mudde’s oft-quoted definition, populism is presented as “an ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Let us set 
aside the obvious epistemological distance between the two perspectives; their emphasis on 
‘discourse’ or ‘ideology’ respectively, their different views on whether populists perceive ‘the 
people’ (and the ‘elite’) as always already ‘homogeneous’ or just involved in some strategic, 
performative operation of collective identification and (relative) unification, on stressing the 
democratic or undemocratic potential of populism(s), and on the necessity or superfluousness 
of additional criteria (like moralization, for example, which seems to operate, within ideational 
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approaches, as the supplement that ties them to a liberal, predominantly anti-populist 
tradition). What then emerges is a set of two minimal criteria: (1) “people-centrism” and (2) 
“anti-elitism” (Stavrakakis 2017b, 528). Together they constitute the common backbone on 
which these two salient perspectives seem to agree (other orientations in populism research, 
like the late work of Margaret Canovan, are also compatible with this designation). This is the 
minimal, formal definition that will be employed in this paper. 
 
2. News media and populism 
The populism versus anti-populism divide is fed by news media, which are often 
“stakeholders” in this divide: left-of-centre media (e.g. CNN and the New York Times in the 
USA, The Guardian and the Independent in the UK) mainly support anti-populist parties (and 
occasionally publish editorials by populism scholars), while conservative media (e.g. Fox News 
in the USA or most British popular press) have a populist outlook on the major political 
issues. All news media contribute to the development of a non-scholarly, “vernacular” (Bale, 
Van Kassel and Taggart 2011, 112; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2016, 18; Hamo et al. 2018, 1) 
populism which partly overlaps with its academic use: as seen in Section 1, the term populism 
is used mainly negatively in academia (i.e. populism is a danger and is connected to 
xenophobia or racism), and newspapers use this pejorative meaning as a rhetorical weapon to 
discredit their enemies. In this sense, as emerging from Hamo, Kampf and Weiss-Yanim’s 
analysis of populism in Israel, political and news discourses often use populism as a “keyword” 
and a metadiscursive, “positioning resource” (2018, 4), characterised by “the moral-evaluative 
undertones of its motivational layer of meaning and its overwhelmingly pejorative sense” 
(2018, 7), which contributes to defining the speaker’s attitude towards the social reality s/he 
describes. Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart (2011) notice how, while the label ‘populist’ can be 
attached to very different political actors and policies, the overall usage of populism in British 
newspapers is pejorative. Similarly, in Greek newspapers, populism is used again negatively 
and is linked either with Syriza, Greece’s left-wing populist party, or with right-wing populist 
movements from abroad (Nikisianis et al. 2018).  
The Daily Mail and The Guardian have been chosen for analysis in this paper because of both 
their popularity (and therefore their influential role in shaping and spreading vernacular uses 
of populism) and their supposedly diverging evaluation of populist politics. The Daily Mail, 
“Britain’s most influential newspaper” (Henderson et al. 2016, 187), is a ‘popular paper,’ with 
a strong focus on entertainment, while The Guardian is a quality paper and its primary 
function is informative (Jucker 1992, 47). The two newspapers may also be distinguished on 
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the basis of their belonging to two distinct categories used to classify newspapers, i.e. 
“popular” vs “elite” (Conboy 2007, 10), a distinction which echoes the key categorization 
(people vs elite) commonly used as the basis of populism. A further difference may be seen in 
the language used by the two newspapers, with the Daily Mail showing the typical 
“emotionally charged” language of tabloids or popular papers, while The Guardian strives to 
use a “neutral language,” appealing to “the cognitive part of ourselves” (Kitis and Milapedes 
1997, 562).  
The differences between the two newspapers extend to politics. The Daily Mail has always 
supported anti-Liberal policies, famously campaigning against immigration and abortion laws, 
and its content, language, and style certainly caters for, using Ostiguy’s term, a “low” 
audience. It campaigned for Leave in the name of nationalism and nativism, attacking at the 
same time the EU and rejecting multiculturalism and globalization (Martinson 2016). The 
Guardian has a mainly left-of-centre attitude and endorsed Remain along with the Daily 
Mirror and the Financial Times (Levy et al. 2016, 4, 10). These deep ideological differences are 
also mirrored by the attitudes towards Brexit of their respective readerships, with The 
Guardian readers largely supporting Remain, while most Daily Mail readers were in favour of 
Brexit (Taylor 2019). The year 2016 was chosen for analysis because of two key populist 
events, i.e. the Leave victory at the Brexit referendum on June and the election of Donald 
Trump as the President of the United States of America in November. If the huge rise of 
worldwide Google searches for populism in 2016 tell us anything about the popularity of the 
term (Mudde 2018), then it is possible to argue that in that year populism became a key 
signifier in the public sphere.  
 
3. Methodology 
The analysis of the metaphors of populism and anti-populism in this paper will employ the 
methodology and tools of Corpus Linguistics, and in particular, considering the goal of the 
research, the Corpus Approach to Critical Metaphor Analysis proposed by Charteris-Black 
(2004). In order to trace the metaphorical constructions of populism, the analysis has been 
carried out on populis* as a search-word, with the (*) working as a wild card in order to gather 
all the samples in the corpora which contain populism, populist, and populists, occurring both 
as head-nouns and in the pre- and post-modifying positions. This allowed us to cover the whole 
spectrum of lexical realisations of the concept of populism. 
A corpus-based approach to discourse is very useful when handling large amounts of data: 
discourse has a cumulative effect, whereby meanings are determined by how language is used 
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and by “working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, 
particular ways of positioning the reader and so forth” (Fairclough 2001, 45). Through the 
analysis of certain recurrent collocations of a certain lexical item, it is possible to measure its 
discourse prosody. Discourse prosody emerges from the interplay of the lexical item(s) with 
other words suggesting a certain discourse. Its analysis gives us information about the 
evaluation that the speaker or writer is giving of that item (Baker 2006, 87-88; Partington, 
Duguid and Taylor 2013, 58-60).  
The theoretical framework proposed by Charteris-Black in his Corpus Approach to Critical 
Metaphor Analysis explains metaphors on the basis of the (often unconscious) use that we 
make of them and of their effect on us (Charteris-Black 2005, 2), and the analysis of 
collocations will enable critical insights into the expressive connotations of metaphors. 
Metaphors play “a central role in the construction of social and political reality” (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 159) because of their evocative power: they are used in the evaluation of a 
discourse topic, and the repetition of the words related to these domains can make a metaphor 
a distinctive part of a specific discourse. 
Section 5 will be devoted to the quantitative and qualitative analysis of populis* in the two 
corpora: the collocations and the clusters of populis*, as well as its discourse prosody, will be 
identified. In Section 6, the results of both the analysis in Section 5 and a preliminary search 
in a sample of texts from both corpora will lead to the identification of “candidate metaphors” 
(Charteris-Black 2004, 35). This will be followed by metaphor interpretation, that is, the 
identification of conceptual metaphors, whereby the ones that have been identified are 
discussed to highlight the kind of relationship they share with the cognitive and pragmatic 
factors determining them. Finally, and as part of the Discussion and Conclusions of this 
paper, through the evidence provided by the two corpora, metaphor explanation will be 
followed by the identification of the ideological and rhetorical motivations of metaphors and 
“the social agency that is involved in their production and their social role in persuasion” 
(Charteris-Black 2004, 39).  
 
4. The two corpora 
The two corpora analysed in this paper (Table 1), collected through LexisNexis (2019), consist 
of the articles published in 2016 in the Daily Mail (henceforth DMC) and The Guardian 
(henceforth GC) in which populis* occurred. 
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Source Daily Mail Guardian 
Articles  
N tokens (running words) in text  
tokens used for word list  
types (distinct words)  
525 
715.646 
705.017 
25.486 
1102 
1.456.321 
1.439.680 
43.158 
Tab. 1: Quantitative description of the DMC and the GC 
 
The disproportion in the size between the two corpora is due to the fact that The Guardian is a 
paper addressing mainly political news, and its use of populis* is wider than that in the Daily 
Mail, a popular newspaper in which political items are less central. The two corpora include 
non-political articles, on subjects such as sport and celebrity culture, in which populis* has 
been quoted. The use of Wordsmith Tools (Scott 2016) has made research into the two corpora 
easier as it has been possible to trace and measure the most important features of the terms 
under exam and their discursive environment.  
 
5. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the corpora  
In Section 1, it has been argued that the meaning of populism is constructed in opposition to 
anti-populism and, crucially for analytical reason, it is done so by anti-populists themselves. 
On the basis of what has been outlined in Section 2, the hypothesis is that a pro-populist 
newspaper (the Daily Mail) and an anti-populist one (The Guardian) may have different 
discourse prosodies and evaluations of populism, on the basis of similar repertoire of tropes 
associated with populism (and built by anti-populists). In this section, the quantitative 
analysis will outline the key differences between the two corpora, and its results will indicate 
the differences in the discourse prosody of populis* between populist discourse and anti-
populist discourse. In this sense, it is expected that polarised evaluations of populism are 
generated by specific narratives that can be rendered in ‘simple’ conceptual metaphors, i.e. 
POPULISM IS GOOD, or POPULISM IS BAD, according to one’s own political bias.  
Overall, populis* appears 820 times in the DMC and 1689 times in the GC. The ratio of 1.56 
occurrences per article in the DMC is slightly higher than that of the GC (1.53), but 
substantially confirms a similar level of discursive attention to the issue and narrative 
coherence. Namely, if populis* is addressed, both the newspapers treat it with an informative 
and cognitive weight that is fundamentally the same, regardless of their political attitude.  
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The Z-score analysis of populism reveals very different patterns, as indicated in Tab. 2 and 
Tab. 3.2 
  
N Word Z Total  N Word Z Total 
9 NATIONALISM 27,51 12  2 CRASS 50,72 14 
11 PLUTOCRATS 26,47 2  3 RIGHTWING 38,23 41 
13 ISOLATIONIST 24,03 5  7 RISE 23,83 30 
14 RISE 23,89 21  8 IGNOBLE 21,35 2 
17 WING 19,69 18  10 NATIONALISM 18,94 12 
     15 CRUDEST 18,52 1 
Tab. 2: Z-score for populism in the DMC   Tab. 3: Z-score for populism in the GC 
 
The comparison between the Z-score for populism in the DMC and GC seem to point to rather 
different discourse prosodies. Three of the top six scores in the GC (crass, ignoble, crudest) 
have a negative connotation and may show the hostile attitude of The Guardian towards 
populism. These terms do not appear among the top six scores of the DM and can therefore be 
considered a distinctive discursive feature of GC. Nationalism appears in both Z-scores, but in 
ranks higher in the DMC than in the GC.  
The Z-scores highlight an important term, rise, which has a very similar Z-score in both the 
DMC and the GC and ranks very highly (14th in the DMC and 7th in the GC). The use of rise 
might imply a possible constituent of a conceptual metaphor, a hypothesis that will be 
explored and discussed in Section 6. The Z-scores for populist reinforces what has been 
discussed so far, as well as the pervasive presence of rise.  
 
Cluster N DMC  Cluster N GC 
RISE OF 12  RIGHTWING  37 
COUNTER RISING  6  CRASS  13 
DRIFT TOWARD  6  RISE OF 10 
ECONOMIC  5  NEW  7 
RIGHTWING  3  CONSERVATIVE  7 
NEW  2  AUTHORITARIAN 7 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT 1  HARD-RIGHT  5 
   ANTI-IMMIGRANT 5 
Tab. 4: Clusters for populism in the DMC       Tab. 5: Clusters for populism in the GC 
 
 
2 The Z-score collocation index has been adopted because it has proven to be the most reliable 
since it considers not only the 5L-5R-word horizon, but the whole universe represented by the 
corpus itself with a specific total sampling. This is the most important element, since in this 
study the dispersion of several concepts is realized by means of conceptual metaphors. 
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Despite specific different preferences in denominating the adjective, the newspapers show a 
tendency to refer to the populist movements rather than parties, thus following the way these 
often name themselves.  
 
N Word Z Total  N Word Z Total 
2 MOVEMENTS 43,72 28  2 RIGHTWING 40,81 72 
3 WING 34,67 53  3 MOVEMENTS 33 34 
4 TONES 28,05 8  4 PARTIES 27,18 65 
7 PARTIES 24,59 36  6 NATIONALIST 25,37 28 
8 RIGHT 23,03 74  7 RIGHT 24,63 107 
11 WAVE 21,85 17  9 RISE 23,24 49 
13 ISLAMOPHOBIC 21,42 7  13 WAVE 19,31 18 
15 MOVEMENT 20,24 28  14 UPRISING 19 9 
16 EUROSCEPTIC 19,93 18  16 FORCES 18,58 26 
24 RISE 18,96 29  18 APPEAL 17,41 25 
27 SURGE 17,79 13  19 NATIONALISM 16,07 17 
31 UPRISINGS 16,62 3  29 MOVEMENT 15,9 39 
33 ANTI 16,13 35  30 ANTI 15,31 47 
34 RHETORIC 16,08 14  32 POLITICIAN 14,54 22 
35 UPRISING 15,86 5  36 EUROSCEPTIC 13,48 13 
36 RIDE 15,80 9  48 DEMAGOGUES 11,64 6 
43 INSURGENTS 15,71 2  49 ANGER 11,62 15 
Tab. 6: Z-score for populist in the DMC     Tab. 7: Z-score for populist in the GC 
 
Three important elements emerge from the Z-score of populist. The first element has to do 
with the denomination of populists. In both corpora, populist ‘attracts’ both movement(s) and 
parties as frequent collocations, indicating a similar level of communication between the 
populists and the anti-populist media, but it does so in different measures: in both the DMC 
and the GC, movement(s) is more frequent than parties, and this may be an indication that, at 
the vernacular level, populists are categorised more often as outsiders than as a party, a more 
traditional and institutional political denomination. In fact, movement and movements score 
higher in the DMC than in the GC, and this indicates a higher attention to them in the right-
wing press. Movement implies militant, often grassroots, and certainly non-conventional and 
extra-institutional political activities. Many collocations in both corpora refer to “the populist 
Five Star Movement,” and in all cases movement(s) are denoted by their status as outsiders, 
variously referring to both right-wing (Donald Trump, Pegida, AfD, UKIP) and left-wing 
(Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn) populist actors and movements/parties.  
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Text 1. Populist movement(s) in the DMC. 
(1) All these populist movements, whether staged or accidental, will erode the majesty 
that the royal family need and must retain to survive 
(2) Ukip isn't really about Europe and immigration—it's a populist movement. 
(3) with opinion polls already predicting a surge in support for the populist anti-
immigration movement AfD. 
(4) you can ride the anger through these populist movements 
(5) They have all the energy and unpredictability of a populist movement, 
(6) The billionaire Republican contender, who has whipped up a populist grassroots 
movement among largely white male voters 
 
Text 2. Populist movement(s) in the GC 
(7) Initially a small protest group, it grew into an amorphous right-wing populist 
movement 
(8) no one can understand Corbyn, Sanders or a host of other populist movements 
(9) This is a blow not just for the former indigenous activist and his Movement to 
Socialism (Mas) coalition, but for the wider progressive populist movement in the 
region 
(10)  Trump has emerged at the head of the pack by building a populist movement of 
discontented blue collar voters 
(11)  What are the problems in the Netherlands that help build these rightwing populist 
movements? 
 
Second, when looking at items related to political discourse in the Z-score charts, the GC is 
often linked to populist as right-wing and nationalist, something that the DM does not do very 
frequently. In terms of discourse prosody, this is in line with a tenet of anti-populism, i.e. the 
fact that populism is automatically identified as a right-wing and nationalist political entity. 
The presence of demagogues ranking high in the GC also suggests a negative evaluation of 
populists. On the other hand, in both the DMC and the GC Eurosceptic ranks highly, while 
Islamophobic appears only in the DMC. Given the completely different bias towards the EU of 
the two newspapers, it is quite clear that the Daily Mail interprets the Eurosceptic nature of 
populist movements quite positively, while The Guardian gives a negative evaluation to 
Euroscepticism. 
Lastly, populist is semantically linked to a number of elements that convey the idea of an 
uprising movement towards the top/high end. Waves, rise, ride, uprising, uprisings, and surge 
(the last two only in the DMC) are mostly natural phenomena and all suggest an upward 
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movement. As already highlighted in the above discussion of the Z-score and clusters of 
populism (Tables 4 and 5), this may also indicate the possible presence of metaphors. These 
elements indicating (mainly upward) movement allow the identification of candidate 
metaphors as indicated by Charteris-Black. Furthermore, they show that the discussion on 
populis* is so complex that the newspapers prefer to avoid a ‘taxonomic’ definition of it, as 
discussed in Section 1, and resort to a simplification that is coded into more manageable 
conceptual metaphors. 
 
6. Metaphors of populism  
The data emerging from the analysis in Section 5 emphasise the presence of rise as a key 
lexical element related to populis* in the two corpora. The association of rise and populism 
indicates the presence of a linguistic realization of a metaphor, and specifically one with a 
physical basis indicating an upward movement, i.e. POPULISM IS GOING UP or, more 
specifically, POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT. This is an orientational metaphor, that is, a 
metaphor in which a concept is given a physical orientation (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14-21). 
POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT can be viewed as an application of the general conceptual 
metaphor of MORE IS UP, a primary metaphor (Grady 1997) whereby increase or expansion of 
some quality or object is metaphorised as physically going up. In politics, this spatial 
metaphor is usually attributed to individuals or groups who become more successful or 
powerful—together with its opposite, LESS IS DOWN, for example in expressions such as ‘the 
rise and fall’—and is very common in defining emerging, often revolutionary, political or social 
movements, especially as consequences of actual or likely changes in power relations. 
Furthermore, as seen in Section 5, a term frequently connected to populists is movement, and 
its original meaning may also resonate with the metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT: 
the term movement is used in the corpus in its more recent meaning as political association or 
“course of acts and endeavours by a body of persons toward some specific end,” (Etymonline 
2020), but its etymology is linked to the Latin movere, to move, and later to the French 
movement, “change of position; passage from place to place” (Etymonline 2020). Even in its 
more recent meaning, the expression (populist) movement may recall a lack of stability in the 
established (fixed) order and its connotation, unlike party, is certainly linked to non-
establishment politics.  
The physical basis of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT is expressed by the fact that the birth 
and success of parties and leaders commonly identified as populist is seen as some kind of 
change in physical status by going upward. The metaphor is well represented in both corpora 
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and this is an indication of the fact that the success of populism was reported extensively by 
both newspapers as an epochal political phenomenon. Rise and populism appear in various 
combinations expressing the metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT (e.g. rising 
populism, the rise in/of populism/populists, populism is on the rise) 21 times in DMC and 24 
times in the GC.  
 
Text 3: examples of corpus lines for ris* and populism in the DMC. 
(12) The rapid rise of political and social populism and accelerating global migration are 
causes of concern 
(13) Asked in August about the rise of right-wing populism around the world, Steinmeier 
targeted those who 'make politics with fear.’ 
(14) The BBC now uses it to describe everything it doesn't like, from Nigel Farage to the 
rise of populism. 
 
Text 4: examples of corpus lines for ris* and populism in the GC. 
(15) nationalistic and authoritarian populism is on the rise. 
(16) to examine both the EU referendum and the general rise of right-wing populism 
(17) I think [elites] are worried about the rising populism 
(18) Petrified by the rise of the populists they try to neuter them 
 
Looking at the context of the above quotations, rise/rises/rising and populism co-occur along 
with other negative terms or expressions: in the DMC the rise of populism is a cause of 
concern and is attributed to those who make politics with fear, while in the GC populism 
appears along with authoritarian, worried and petrified. Clearly, then, the metaphorical 
association of populism with the upward movement implied in rise carries with it a generally 
negative evaluation in terms of discourse prosody. However, while the presence of rise of 
populis* is quite pervasive in both corpora, in the DMC all of its 21 occurrences are quotations 
or paraphrases from politicians and other celebrities who are hostile to populism, and not once 
does the metaphor appear in the direct words of the Daily Mail’s journalists. Thus, the lexical 
realisation of the POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT in rise/rises/rising and populism 
expresses the negative evaluation of populism coming from those who oppose it, and not from 
the Daily Mail itself.  
The metaphorical use of rise is not limited to populism as a noun. Nouns such as parties, 
extremism, sentiment, forces, politics and rhetoric are often premodified by the adjective 
populist and are also expressed in metaphorical terms as upward movement through the use 
of rise.  
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Text 5: corpus lines for ris* of populist + noun in the DMC. 
(19) Far-right leader Marine Le Pen could WIN France's presidential elections due to the 
rise of populist politics and the success of Trump 
(20) in a reference to the predicted rise of Italy's populist Five-Star opposition movement 
(21) Instead his leadership and liberal modernisation project was knocked off course first 
by a financial crisis, then by the rise of a populist force on his right flank 
 
Text 6: corpus lines for ris* of populist + noun in the GC. 
(22) Heir to throne talks of 'disturbing echoes' and rise of populist extremism 
(23)  The rise of populist, anti-establishment parties and figures 
(24)  something Britain can ill afford given the rise in populist identity politics 
 
The discourse prosody of the lines quoted above from the GC expresses a negative evaluation 
of populism: populist extremism connects with disturbing echoes, and populist parties and 
figures with anti-establishment, while the rise of populist identity politics is in the context of 
something Britain can ill afford. In the DMC, only example (21) may imply a negative 
judgement of populism (‘liberal modernisation project was knocked off course’ by the rise of 
populism), while the two other uses refer to the possible victories of populist leaders and 
movements in France and Italy without any clear evaluative orientation. The nouns linked to 
ris* and populis* may be classified according to two main semantic fields: politics and feelings 
(Tab. 8).  
Politics DMC GC 
EXTREMISM 0 6 
FIGURE(S) 0 1 
FIVE-STAR MOVEMENT 0 2 
FORCE(S) 1 2 
GROUP(S) 6 5 
INTOLERANCE 0 1 
MOVEMENT(S) 6 5 
NATIONALISM 0 1 
PARTY(IES) 3 16 
PHENOMENON 1 0 
POLITICS 2 4 
REVOLTS 0 1 
RHETORIC 0 1 
RIGHT 1 6 
TENDENCIES 0 1 
TRUMP 0 1 
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Feelings DMC GC 
FEAR 0 1 
MOOD 0 2 
RESENTMENT 0 1 
SENTIMENT 1 1 
Tab. 8: Classification of lexical items modified by populis* in connection with MOVEMENT as 
a source domain 
 
The much larger use of rise of populist party/ies in the GC compared to the DCM indicates 
that The Guardian highlights the increasing (and threatening) success of populists more than 
the Daily Mail by using the MORE IS UP aspect of the POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT 
metaphor. Furthermore, the GC constantly associates this metaphor to parties of the far or 
extreme right as well as to populist parties and indicates their success in various nations.  
 
Text 7: examples of metaphors for rise and party/parties in the GC. 
(25)  aided the rise of the rightwing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
(26)  A new rightwing populist party is on the rise 
(27)  As Europe grapples with the rise of anti-immigration parties 
(28)  liken the political mood in Austria to that before the rise of the Nazi party  
(29)  the Cronulla riots and the rise of the Tea Party 
(30)  the rise of Farage's party was fed by deep problems 
(31)  The rise of populist, anti-establishment parties and figures 
 
The collocation of rise with the Nazi Party, the Tea Party and rightwing party communicates a 
negative evaluation, given the mainly liberal readership of The Guardian.  
The discussion of the Z-score of populist in Section 5 highlights the importance of two more 
lexical items associated with populism, wave and tide, which may be singled out as possible 
candidates for metaphors. Wave and tide denote massive (and potentially dangerous) 
movements of water, suggesting the metaphor POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON. Given 
the nature of its lexical realisations, this metaphor may be considered a subset of the more 
general metaphor of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT. POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON 
is an ontological metaphor, that is, a metaphor in which abstract entities or concepts, such as 
emotions or ideas, are turned into tangible objects observable in reality (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 25-26). Populist wave occurs six times in the DMC and five times in the GC. 
 
Demata, Conoscenti and Stavrakakis   Riding the Populist Wave 
 
Saggi/Essays  25 
Issue 15—Spring/Summer 2020 
Iperstoria 
 
 
Text 8: corpus lines of populist wave in the DMC. 
(32) fiercely anti-migrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban rides a populist wave across the 
bloc 
(33) Donald Trump hopes to ride the same populist wave to victory in the US 
(34) Labour leader wants to embrace an anti-establishment populist wave in politics 
(35) Neither likely November rivals really square with 2016's populist wave 
(36) The likely November rivals' personal portfolios don't exactly square with the populist 
wave defining 2016 
(37) The One Nation leader, who rode her own populist wave back to Canberra in the July 
federal election 
 
Text 9: Corpus lines of populist wave in the GC. 
(38) EU referendum: the next big populist wave could sweep Britain out of Europe 
(39) not just Trump but many of the populist movements now making waves around the 
world 
(40) Sanders is hoping to capture the same populist wave that carried Zephyr Teachout's  
(41) “There is a real risk of a populist wave leading to safeguards being watered down or 
jettisoned” 
(42) Trump's economic view is far from neoliberal, but it rides a populist wave 
 
Populist is connected to tide only twice in the DMC, and eight times in the GC.  
 
Text 10: corpus lines of populist tide in the DMC. 
(43) And Twenty20 can carry it along on a tide of new populism 
(44) ‘A rising tide of populism threatens to undermine what has long been one of the 
world's most prosperous regions’ 
 
Text 11: corpus lines of populist tide in the GC. 
(45) a scarlet letter in a year when a populist, anti-establishment tide swept US politics 
(46) Bannon was appointed this week by Trump to help channel the populist tide that 
drove him to the top of the Republican ticket  
(47) Facing a rising populist tide led by Sanders on the left 
(48) In 2016, the tide of rightwing populism has seemed unstoppable 
(49) many of those deemed to be dissenting from the tide of rightwing populism have 
experienced the same 
(50) The tides of populism and nationalism currently sweeping many developed countries 
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(51) when Germany would find itself facing a rising tide of populism in the context of the 
refugee crisis 
(52) where parties of the right will be looking to surf the populist tide that carried Trump 
to his win 
 
The GC corpus contains one example of an even more destructive natural phenomenon.  
 
Text 12: corpus line of populist tsunami in the GC. 
(53) unless there is a tsunami of populism sweeping over the nation 
 
Natural phenomena such as waves, tides and tsunamis communicate destructive and 
uncontrollable effects (they rise, are unstoppable, and sweep the places they encounter), and 
both populist leaders and populism are somehow blended with them and become one with 
their force, as populists surf or ride them. The close association of populism with such natural 
phenomena may also be seen in the use of populist as a premodifier of other concepts related 
to wave. Populist premodifies nouns expressing metaphors of natural phenomena quantified 
as wave six times in the DMC and three times in the GC, which is quite remarkable, given the 
imbalance in the size of the two corpora: 
 
Text 13: corpus lines of populist* as a premodifier of nouns indicating metaphors of natural 
phenomena in the DMC. 
(54) Donald Trump has stunned America and the world, riding a wave of populist 
resentment to defeat Hillary Clinton 
(55) Expect a wave of populist uprisings across the world against liberal elites 
(56) The former Prime Minister complained that Labour was turning into a 'party of 
protest' as he voiced fears about a wave of populist politics in Western democracies. 
(57) The former reality TV star rode to victory on a wave of populist resentment 
(58) There is growing concern in France that the same wave of populist, anti-globalisation 
anger that carried Trump to the White House 
(59) Trump has ridden a wave of populist anger with Washington 
 
Text 14: corpus lines of populist* as a premodifier in metaphors of natural phenomena in the 
GC. 
(60) On the Republican side, that wave of populist outrage has fueled Donald Trump's 
campaign 
(61) the current wave of populist insurgents are all in the fear business 
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(62) The current wave of populist politics, mostly nationalistic and xenophobic 
 
Populist premodifies nouns denoting strong emotional states in connection with with wave six 
times in the DMC (anger and resentment twice, outrage, uprisings), and only once in the GC 
(wave of populist outrage). Again, in terms of discourse prosody, a negative evaluation of this 
metaphorical construct is expressed by anti-populist actors only once in the DMC, in Tony 
Blair’s reported quotation in (56), and more widely in the GC, where again populist has a 
negative prosody through its connection with fear business and mostly nationalistic and 
xenophobic.  
Tide is also used very frequently in metaphors in which the target domain indicates violent 
emotions, such as rage or anger: 
 
Text 15: corpus lines of tide as part of the NATURAL PHENOMENA metaphors in the DMC. 
(63) Anyone who is so complacent as to excuse the Cameron list so easily is ignoring the 
rising tide of public disillusionment with our political institutions.  
(64) Like some Western equivalent of the Arab Spring, a tide of anti-elitist resentment has 
shaken the capitals of the world's richest countries. 
(65) So rather than stand Canute-like against the rising alt-right tide, the bearded one 
plans to surf it. 
(66) The rising tide of public anger makes it increasingly harder for the chancellor 
(67) The tide of anti-establishment feeling could also reach Italy today 
(68) The tide of discontent could yet reach Italy today 
(69) The tide of disenchantment which is flowing away from the mainstream parties in 
Spain, Italy, France 
 
The above metaphors of natural phenomena in which tide appears are not linked to populist, 
but the lexical items which realise them are the same as those used in metaphors involving 
populist and wave/tide: emotions (discontent, disillusionment, disenchantment, resentment), 
populist politics (anti-elitist movement) or both (anti-establishment feeling).  
Another term which suggests an upward movement or flood is surge, which, like ride and 
wave, also scores highly in the Z-score of populis*. It appears as part of metaphors involving 
populis* 13 times in the DMC and 7 times in the GC. 
 
Text 16: corpus lines with surge and populis* in the DMC 
(70) for a populist surge of working-class people on either side of the Atlantic 
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(71) Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi became the latest victim of the populist surge 
against Brussels. 
(72) The surge of populist politics of the Right 
 
Text 17: corpus lines with surge and populis* in the GC 
(73) as the populist surge spreads and accepted norms are discarded 
(74) defending Rust Belt swing states that once looked vulnerable to Trump's populist 
surge 
 
The above analysis shows that, while the metaphors of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT and 
POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON draw on different source domains, they do share a 
common semantic terrain. Whether it is something rising, a wave or a tide, or whether 
populist premodifies other signifiers expressing the same source domain of natural 
phenomena, the notion of populism is always linked to metaphors expressing some movement 
upward (waves or tides may be seen as going ‘up’), a movement which implies a change in 
physical state described in dramatic fashion. Indeed, the use of metaphors connected to 
upward movement is not limited to populism but extends to concepts or emotions somehow 
connected to it, either through the premodifier populist, or by sharing the semantic field of 
emotions. Indeed, populism has always been related to the strong emotions such as hate and 
anger attributed to disenfranchised people. This relationship is made evident through certain 
commonly shared metaphors, which generate some kind of semantic alignment between 
populism, the strong emotions connected to it, and (mainly right-wing) leaders and 
movements. 
The metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT may imply different evaluations: the populist 
Daily Mail uses the physical basis of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT to define populism as 
something good or at least neutral, while the discourse prosody of the same metaphors in The 
Guardian or in those politicians opposing populism quoted in the DMC suggests a negative 
evaluation of populism by anti-populists. The spatial metaphors at the basis of our culture 
posit that the physical basis of certain metaphors suggests positive values, as in MORE IS UP 
and GOOD IS UP. However, as explained by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 22-23), for certain 
subcultures and groups MORE IS UP may prevail on GOOD IS UP, which may then be turned into 
BAD IS UP. This is the case of certain representations of the wave/tide metaphors, which may 
denote natural phenomena difficult to control: they are often linked to negative feelings in the 
political space and emphasise the threat or violence coming from certain social groups or 
phenomena. For example, they are very common in politics and media as part of domains 
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evaluated negatively, such as immigration in racist discourses. These metaphors have often 
been used to characterize people arriving (or threatening to arrive) in Europe or the USA, 
such as migrants, asylum seekers or refugees, who are seen as a threat to the social order and 
are evaluated negatively (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 59-60; Semino 2008, 118-23; Musolff 2015, 
45-46). 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
The antagonistic political space opened up by the struggle between populism and anti-
populism as discussed in Section 1 results into diverging discursive articulations of 
“vernacular” populism: the discourse prosody of populis* in the two corpora discussed in 
Section 3 communicates different evaluations of populism, with certain marked lexical options 
in The Guardian that communicate a distinctly hostile attitude to populism, as in the 
collocations rightwing populism and crass populism. The pejorative meaning of populism, 
which has become naturalised and embedded in both populist and anti-populist discourse, is 
somehow amplified by The Guardian, while the Daily Mail links populism to Euroscepticism 
and Islamophobia, which certainly do not communicate a negative evaluation among its 
readers. A key aspect in the populism/anti-populism divide between the two newspapers is 
their use of the same set of metaphors, POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT. In confirmation of 
the hegemony played by the anti-populists in setting up discursive elements and strategies 
across the board, the populist Daily Mail uses the same (anti-populist) metaphor as The 
Guardian, thus reflecting the fact that the discursive realisations of populism usually created 
by those who oppose it, are also used by those who support it. The metaphor reflects the 
pejorative evaluation which is usually attached to entities described as ‘moving up.’ However, 
in the DMC this pejorative evaluation is decisively toned down and does not generally carry 
the negative discourse prosody which appears so frequently in the GC. On the other hand, the 
Daily Mail shows a preference for such metaphors in connection with strong and ‘low’ 
emotions much more often than The Guardian. This is in line with the kind of readership 
addressed by the Daily Mail and indicates the preference of the newspaper for the typical 
populist ‘style,’ as defined by Moffitt (2016). 
Metaphorical constructs of populism are crucial in the way populism is codified and 
understood in discourse. The metaphors of populism analysed in the two corpora discussed 
here have proved that the concept of populism is made visible in discourse by representing it 
on the basis of orientational as well as material conceptualisations. Indeed, the orientational 
nature of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT may be seen as deriving from (and further 
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contributing to) a wider metaphorical scenario of society in vertical terms. Populism is traced 
in discourse through the use of well-trodden metaphors according to which politics and society 
are given a vertical dimension. The discursive realisations of populism in vertical terms (as 
‘rising’) is part of the mapping of populism in terms of a conceptual metaphor which allows (or 
makes) us see society and politics in hierarchical terms. The conceptual aspects related to the 
ontological metaphor of POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON, with tides or waves which also 
rise, strengthen the general perception and representation of populism as a threat to the 
established (vertical) order. Thus, the populist hostility to the elite can be metaphorised and 
‘seen’ as a movement upward within the social structure from below, a ‘below’ embodied by the 
people, whose anger and social aspirations threaten the socially ‘high’ locations of the elite. 
Indeed, some theoretical constructs of populism seem to follow the same conceptual metaphor: 
both Ostiguy’s concept of populism as defined by a struggle between ‘high’ and ‘low’—in social, 
political and moral terms—and De Cleen and Stavrakakis’s codification of populism, 
mentioned in Section 1, along a vertical axis which intersects with the horizontal axis of 
nationalism follow the same spatial organisation of society. 
As populism is a phenomenon taking place in the socio-political sphere, it would be quite 
obvious to expect metaphors sharing the same or similar source domains as those used to 
represent other political movements. The structure of society is indeed very often represented 
with certain metaphorical scenarios drawn from spatial organisations and, as a consequence, 
social hierarchization is also metaphorised spatially. Social space is generally based on a 
hierarchy which is organised and qualified as physical space. In general, the appropriation of 
physical space functions “as a spontaneous metaphor for the social order” (Bourdieu 2018, 
106). As argued by Bourdieu, “social space is inscribed both in the objectivity of spatial 
structures and in the subjectivity of mental structures, which are in part the product of the 
embodiment of these objectified structures” (Bourdieu 2018, 108). Conceptual metaphors with 
a physical basis having social organisation as their target may be a preferred gateway into the 
conceptualization of social space in discourse. For example, the organisation of society is 
traditionally described and visualised in vertical terms and represented in language according 
to a vertical classification (Ossowski 1963), and this classification extends to political practice 
as well as discourse. The social structure of the West is traditionally viewed in vertical terms, 
with the establishment and the wealthy seen as ‘high’ (realised by a myriad of lexical items, 
such as high society, friends in high places, social climber, the top 1%), and the poor and the 
disadvantaged seen at the bottom. The vertical classification of society is actually created and 
institutionalised socially but is so ingrained in our socio-political consciousness to appear 
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“natural and inevitable” (Kreckel 1990, 142). Indeed, being “the ‘natural language’ of social 
inequality” (Schwartz 1981, 150) and “the effect of naturalization” (Bourdieu 2018, 107; italics 
in the original) typical of the way social realities are inscribed in the natural world, this 
vertical classification may constitute the framework for both the representation and the 
interpretation of political practice, actors and events.  
The recurrence of certain metaphors of populism in the Daily Mail and The Guardian 
indicates that news media follow a traditional physical or spatial arrangement of social 
agents. Happening in the year when populism was seen as ‘rising,’ this fact in a way facilitates 
as well as constraints the perception and interpretation of populism: in the antagonistic social 
space opened up by populism in which the ‘people’ aspire to dismantle the privileges of the 
elite, ‘going up’ signals a struggle to advance in the social and political hierarchy and probably 
even an edge in these struggles. This is done according to prevailing models which may not 
always represent the complexity and the political uniqueness of populism. 
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